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Abstract 
This article draws upon the work of Timothy Morton and Slavoj Žižek in order to critically 
examine how mountain bike trail builders orientated themselves within nature relations. 
Beginning with a discussion of the key ontological differences between Morton’s object-
oriented ontology and Žižek’s blend of Hegelian-Lacanianism, we explore how Morton’s 
dark ecology and Žižek’s account of the radical contingency of nature, can offer parallel 
paths to achieving an ecological awareness that neither idealises nor mythologises nature, 
but instead, acknowledges its strange (Morton) and contingent (Žižek) form. Empirically, 
we support this theoretical approach in interviews with twenty mountain bike trail builders. 
These interviews depicted an approach to trail building that was ambivalently formed 
in/with the contingency of nature. In doing so, the trail builders acted with a sense of 
temporal awareness that accepted the radical openness of nature, presenting a ‘symbolic 
framework’ that was amiable to nature’s ambivalent, strange and contingent form. In 
conclusion, we argue that we should not lose sight of the ambivalences and strange 
surprises that emanate from our collective and unpredictable attempts to symbolize nature 
and that such knowledge can coincide with Morton’s ‘dark ecology’ – an ecological 
awareness that remains radically open to our ecological existence. 
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Introduction 
In recent years there has been a widespread backlash against the ‘anthropocentric’, 
‘human exceptionalist’ and ‘arrogant humanist’ bias of much academic scholarship 
on political ecology (Escobar 1999; Ingold 2000; Krauss 2013; Morton 2007; 
Sponheim 2007; Swyngedouw 2015). Indeed, a number of thinkers have called for a 
more ‘ecocentric’ approach, defined by an attempt to place nature, ‘writ large’, at the 
centre of moral, political and scientific concern (Sutton 2004). A key motivation for 
scholars is to develop an ecologically informed notion of ‘relatedness’, according to 
which all organisms, both human and non-human, are related to and constituted by 
the environments in which they inhabit (Eckersley 1997; Rickly 2016). This is 
encapsulated in studies of the Anthropocene and the acknowledgement that current 
environmental transformations are the result of human habitation on earth (Robbins 
and Moore 2013; Wark 2015). 
 With regard to this literature we draw upon the work of Timothy Morton and 
Slavoj Žižek in order to critically examine two contrasting perspectives on nature, 
culture and ecology in the context of mountain bike trail building (Morton 2016, 
2017, 2018; Žižek 1991, 2016). In fact, while both academics have argued for an 
ecology without nature (Morton 2016, 2018; Taylor 2009; Žižek 1991, 2016), their 
approaches remain ontologically divided between Morton’s (2016) object-oriented 
ontology, reflected in his dark ecology, and Žižek’s (1991) dialectically infused 
Lacanianism, which is brought to light in his assertions that we should denaturalise 
nature by accepting nature’s inherent contingency. Notwithstanding the important 
ontological differences between both Morton and Žižek, this paper will provide the 
following critique. 
 First, attention will be given to the object-oriented ontology paradigm and its 
relation to Morton’s dark ecology and his notion of the symbiotic real. Given that this 
discussion will seek to highlight how ontological debates can prove effective in 
(re)interpreting the nature-culture dyad, we will also consider Žižek’s contention that 
our conceptions of nature require a radical ‘de-naturalizing’. This critique will draw 
upon Žižek’s understanding of subjectivity and Lacan’s objet petit a (objet a) in order 
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to highlight how both approaches can provide a parallax account of nature and 
culture in the Anthropocene.  
Empirically, this approach will be supported by interviews that were 
conducted with twenty mountain bike trail builders. Specifically, these interviews will 
be used to highlight how the trail builders’ construction of mountain bike trails was 
ambivalently formed in/with the contingency of nature. As a consequence, it will be 
argued that such acknowledgement is demonstrative of not only Žižek’s assertion 
that humanity should (re)orientate itself to a symbolization that works in accordance 
with nature’s ‘natural’ destruction, but that such forms of contingency can prove 
amiable to Morton’s dark ecology, as predicated on an ecological awareness that 
remains radically open to our ecological existence. It is in this vein that we hope to 
draw upon both authors’ work in order to offer an empirically supported account of 
how the cultural dimensions of nature can be re-symbolized in light of the trail 
builders’ relations in/with nature. It will be argued that this can advance our 
understanding of ecology and nature, by radically re-appropriating how cultural 
geographers define and approach these terms.  
 
Object-oriented ontology, the symbiotic real and dark ecology 
At its heart, the approach adopted by object-oriented ontology is one that is 
grounded in the fundamental rejection of Kantian correlationalism, reflected in Kant’s 
anthropocentric privileging of ‘the human’ in ontological discussions (Harman 2017). 
Instead: 
 
OOO [object-oriented ontology] holds that there are real things, and that 
these real things are objects, every single one. We humans are objects. The 
thing called a ‘subject’ is an object. Sentient beings are objects. Notice that 
‘object’ here doesn’t mean something that is automatically apprehended by a 
subject. There are all kinds of objects that so-called subjects don’t 
apprehend. Global warming existed long before human instruments started to 
detect it. For millions of years oil oozed around deep under the ocean. All 
kinds of objects apprehended it, of course. When we are conscious of 
something, we are on a continuum with rock strata and plankton that 
apprehend oil in their own way (Morton 2013: 149). 
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In his criticisms of correlationism, Morton (2018) proposes his notion of the 
symbiotic real, which denotes a solidarity between humans and non-humans that 
works in contrast to subject-object dichotomies. For Morton, ‘Human means me plus 
my nonhuman prostheses and symbionts, such as my bacterial microbiome and my 
technological gadgets, an entity that cannot be determined in advance within a thin, 
rigid outline or rigidly demarcated from the symbiotic real’ (Morton 2017: 40).  
Certainly, the significance of Morton’s approach is that while dissolving the 
privileged position of humans (much like object-oriented ontology and the New 
Materialist and speculative realist perspectives), he remains ‘careful not to attribute 
actions (and their consequences) to the subjective realization of individual volition 
and intentionality’ (Elsaesser 2018: 3). Rather, such realization is suffused with a 
sense of ambiguity from which the gap between subject and object, retranslated as 
object and object, becomes increasingly blurred and undefinable via an explosion of 
interdependence that neither starts nor finishes. For Morton, it is the withdrawal of 
objects which underscores the ‘strangeness’ and sense of anxiety that permeates 
the Anthropocene, a fact that ‘becomes clearer as we enter the ecological crisis – 
“Has it started yet? How far in are we?”’ (Morton 2013: 56). This confusion 
characterizes Morton’s (2016) dark ecology, which describes our sudden awareness 
that our actions are both knowingly and unknowingly entwined with the environment. 
Consequently, dark ecology posits ‘a mode of existence in which nature is treated 
as strange rather than familiar, and the individual is encouraged to question reified 
versions of nature in both their aesthetic and experiential forms’ (Cherrington et al. 
2018: 14). 
Nevertheless, by way of extending this approach, the remainder of this article 
will undertake an alternative path. Indeed, while open to the ecological awareness 
that Morton’s (2016) dark ecology prescribes, the following discussion will serve to 
elaborate on the ambivalence and confusion which characterizes our ecological 
entwinement. Subsequently, whereas the following sections will offer a critique of 
Morton’s object-oriented ontology approach, more importantly, this discussion will be 
used to extend and elaborate on his dark ecological perspective by supplementing 
his analysis with an understanding of the Anthropocene that redirects human 
awareness to the relative contingency of nature. In fact, in interviews with mountain 
bike trail builders it be will examined how Morton’s ecological awareness is reflected 
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in the various ways in which the trail builders interact in/with nature and its manifold 
objects. In meeting this aim, we will turn to the work of Slavoj Žižek. 
 
A balanced nature? 
Žižek’s (1991) account of nature and ecology takes aim at liberal ideologies, which 
present nature as a harmonious entity (Mother Earth) that has been violated and 
unbalanced by human action. Here, nature is often predicated on a presupposed 
notion of a stable equipoise, which is subsequently unbalanced by humanity’s 
hubris, yet, at the same time, redeemable through (unchallenged) attempts to rectify 
our mistakes and rebalance nature. Indeed, these accounts: 
 
rely on … a vision of a ‘normal’ state of things where the cycle is closed and 
the balance re-established, as if the Anthropocene (where human activity 
introduced imbalance and opens up the metabolic rift) should be overcome 
by reinstalling human species into a balanced natural order. … the fiction of a 
stable nature disturbed by human interventions is wrong even as an 
inaccessible ideal which we may approach if we withdraw as much as 
possible from our activity – nature is already in itself disturbed, out of joint 
(Žižek 2016: 31 see also Wark 2015). 
 
Key to this interpretation is Žižek’s Lacanian influence. Drawing upon Lacan’s 
notion of the Real – that which distorts language and meaning, and which cannot be 
reduced to experience but nevertheless serves to structure this experience – Žižek 
contends ‘that we must learn to accept the real of the ecological crisis in its 
senseless actuality, without charging it with some message or meaning’ (Žižek 
1991: 35). Our attempts to grasp the ecological crisis and halt its progression, 
present only lukewarm responses which simply ‘avoi[d] an encounter with the real’ 
(Žižek 1991: 35). Here, Žižek asks: 
 
Is not the disturbed, derailed course of nature an ‘answer of the real’ to 
human praxis, to the human encroachment upon nature, ‘mediated’ and 
organized by the symbolic order? The radical character of the ecological 
crisis is not to be underestimated. The crisis is radical not only because of its 
effective danger, i.e., it is not just that what is at stake is the very survival of 
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humankind. What is at stake is our most unquestionable presuppositions, the 
very horizon of our meaning, our everyday understanding of ‘nature’ as a 
regular, rhythmic process. (Žižek 1991: 34) 
 
Rather than ignoring or cynically distancing ourselves from the ecological 
crisis, the above comments serve to redirect attention to the interpretive horizon 
which both marks but also limits ‘our everyday understanding of “nature”’ (Zizek 
1991: 34). As a result, it is our interpretation of Nature – as stable, ongoing and 
always present – which comes undone in the face of ecological catastrophe. Under 
such circumstances, it is our fictions of nature which act ‘as the stand-in for other 
repressed, disavowed or foreclosed longings and passions – the Lacanian objet 
petit a around which we shape our drives and that disguises the lack of ground on 
which to base our subjectivity’ (Swyngedouw 2015: 134). 
Indeed, before returning to Lacan’s objet a, the following section will serve to 
take stock of the ontological premises underlying both Morton and Žižek’s work. 
Here, critical attention will be given to examining the ontological differences between 
Morton’s flat ontology, which views everything (human and non-human) as an 
object, and Žižek’s consideration of the subject, and how this can be related to 
nature’s ‘contingent’ symbolization. 
 
Ontology and the nature-culture dyad: A flat ontology or subjective excess? 
While object-oriented ontology does not ignore ‘the human’, it instead argues that 
humans should not be viewed as the privileged actors in human/non-human 
relations. As a result, it serves to ‘flatten out’ our ontological understanding, so that: 
‘human subjects are just one in the series of disparate objects’ (Žižek 2017: 39). 
Yet, as Elsaesser notes: 
 
however much object-oriented ontology, post-humanism, the new materialism 
or speculative realism might wish to cut the Gordian knot and get rid of 
subjectivity, they still have to manage the unbridgeable gap between self and 
other, of ‘being in the world’ and yet excluded from it, of depending on a 
myriad of relations with others, just to be a separate entity, an individual. 
(Elsaesser 2018: 16-17) 
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Accordingly, Žižek’s ontology draws attention to the importance of the ‘gap’ – 
that which reflects a fundamental void between reality and being. In clarifying the 
significance of this gap/void, Taylor explains: 
 
Paradoxically, in order to be experienced at all, our sense of both reality and 
our subjective selves needs to contain an irreducible gap, a lack from which 
meaningful experience can be generated. In terms of the relationship 
between subjects and the external physical world that confronts and contains 
them, this lack/gap can be explained in terms of the symbolic order that we 
construct so that an otherwise excessively raw reality can be encountered in 
a meaningful, non-overwhelming fashion (Taylor 2010: 73)  
 
The importance of the ‘gap’, therefore, is that it helps to maintain the ‘meaning that 
supports our existence’ (Vighi 2014: 132). In so doing, Žižek’s work presents a 
dialectical approach to the subject-object distinction, whereby, subject and object 
are neither separately distinguished nor are they transcended to the extent that the 
subject simply becomes another object (Žižek 2012). Instead, a dialectic tension 
between subject and object (objective reality) is reflected by the fact that the 
subject’s relation ‘to reality is always mediated by a contingent symbolic process’ 
from which ‘a certain excessive fixity intervenes’, on behalf of the subject, which 
consequently allows them to experience reality as a ‘subject’ (Žižek 2008: 120). 
Indeed, ‘if we abstract this subjective excess from the objective symbolic order, the 
very objectivity of this order disintegrates’ (Žižek 2017: 194-195). As a result, in 
contradistinction to a flat ontology, for Žižek, ‘the way to be a consequent materialist 
is not to directly include subject into reality, as an object among objects, but to bring 
out the Real of the subject, the way the emergence of subjectivity functions as a cut 
in the Real’ (Žižek 2016: 70). 
Certainly, Žižek’s remarks provide a clear point of contrast between his own 
dialectical ontology and Morton’s object-oriented ontology. That is, whereas object-
oriented ontology attempts to transcend the ‘unbridgeable gap between self and 
other’ (Elsaesser 2018: 16) via the object’s withdrawal – a withdrawal that makes it 
inaccessible and, subsequently, in the case of Morton, presents ‘a rift between … 
appearance and its essence’ (Morton 2013: 168) – Žižek ‘transpos[es] 
epistemological obstacles into the thing [the object] itself’ (Žižek 2016: 56). In other 
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words, ‘We do not reach the In-itself by way of tearing away subjective appearances 
and trying to isolate ‘objective reality’ as it is “out there,” independently of the 
subject’, but rather, ‘the In-itself inscribes itself precisely into the subjective excess, 
gap, inconsistency that opens up a hole in reality. This gap is missed … by OOO 
[object-oriented ontology]’ (Žižek 2016: 85). Accordingly, while the above discussion 
has sought to trace the key ontological differences between Morton’s ‘object’ 
ontology and Žižek’s Hegelian-Lacanianism, the following section, and subsequent 
findings, will aim to bring together these two oppositions. To do so, however, will 
require a turn to Lacan’s objet a. 
 
Objet a and the strange strangeness of nature’s contingency: Dark ecology 
and a denaturalised nature 
Despite his criticisms of object-oriented ontology, Žižek still maintains that the 
‘subject effectively ‘is’ an object’ (Žižek 2016: 80-81); yet, one that is posited in 
relation to Lacan’s notion of the objet a. For Lacan: 
 
there is no subject which is not correlated to an object, objet a – but this 
object is a paradoxical one, an object which fills in the void, a gap in the very 
texture of reality – it is this object which in effect rips the seamless texture of 
reality and holds the place of a gap in it. (Žižek 2017: 43)  
 
This ‘gap’ becomes apparent when we consider how ‘the various different Symbolic 
appropriations of the object are split internally and derive from different attempts to 
get at the object itself’ (i.e. nature) (Flisfeder 2012: 147). Consequently, ‘In order to 
conceive this status of objet a, we have to accomplish a move from lacking object to 
object which stands for the lack, which gives body to it – only this object “is” subject’ 
(Žižek 2016: 43). 
Indeed, if we follow the Žižekian contention that the gap between subjective 
experience and objective reality ‘is a crucial, positive and constitutive one that 
generates meaning and identity’ (Carpentier and Trioen 2010: 318), then it is clear 
that such an approach stands in direct contrast to Morton’s (and object-oriented 
ontology’s) anti-correlationism. According to Morton: 
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the idea that the world isn’t real until some correlator (usually tied to a human 
being in some way) has ‘realized’ it, can produce the fantasy that reality is a 
blank slate waiting for (human) projections to fill it in, like a movie screen 
waiting for a movie to be shown on it. (Morton 2018: 206)  
 
Nonetheless, while acknowledging Morton’s (2018) critique, it is apparent that this 
contention rests primarily on the ‘fantasies’ that are used, by humans, to fill reality’s 
‘blank slate’. Indeed, nature is often used to explore an individual’s ‘true’, ‘authentic’, 
‘inner-being’ (Arnauld and Price 1993), providing ‘the subjective element constitutive 
of objective-external reality’ (Žižek 2017: 194). Moreover, it is here that we can 
begin to examine the extent to which nature ‘stands for the lack’ within subjectivity 
(Žižek 2016: 43). Consequently, if, as Morton asserts, ‘the politics of coexistence are 
always contingent, brittle and flawed, so that in the thinking of interdependence at 
least one being must be missing’ (Morton 2016: 6 [italics added]); then, in the 
context of ecology, this ‘being’ is rendered by the fact that nature is effectively 
‘missing’, until it is symbolized. It is in this regard that: 
 
the natures we see and work with are necessarily imagined, scripted and 
symbolically charged as nature. These inscriptions are always inadequate, 
leaving an excess or remainder, while maintaining a distance from co-
produced natures that are complex, chaotic, often unpredictable, radically 
contingent, historically and geographically variable, risky, patterned in 
endlessly complex ways and ordered along ‘strange’ attractors. 
(Swyngedouw 2015: 135) 
 
Furthermore, amidst our current ecological crisis, it is nature which stands as ‘an 
entity that has no substantial consistency, which is in itself “nothing but confusion”’ 
(Žižek 2016: 81); yet, nevertheless, sets in motion a multitude of interpretations and 
(failed) actions, each attempting to ‘fix’ the ecological crisis and, in this instance, re-
balance nature’s disorder. As a result, ‘the inherent slipperiness of’ any conceptual 
understanding of nature, requires an appreciation of ‘the multiplicities, 
inconsistencies and incoherencies of its symbolization’ (Žižek 2016: 134); and, more 
importantly, that such symbolization rests upon a level ambivalence that strikes a 
path between Morton’s dark ecology and Žižek’s unbalanced nature. 
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That is, if we consider Žižek’s approach to the ecological crisis as grounded 
in the critique that our (mis)understandings of nature as ‘balanced’ should be 
redefined in accordance with nature’s instability; then, one of the consequences of 
our ecological crisis is that it requires a radical denaturalization of nature itself. It is 
this denaturalization which points to a more fundamental acceptance of nature’s 
radical contingency; an assertion that provides a link with Morton’s redefining of 
nature (Morton 2013). For Morton, acknowledging our ecological awareness 
requires ‘letting go of … nature’ (Morton 2018: 27); in other words, we need to let go 
of our usual ways of ‘seeing’ nature. Indeed, such ‘letting go’ is amiable to Žižek’s: 
 
radical emancipatory politics [which] should aim neither at complete mastery 
over nature nor at humanity’s humble acceptance of the predominance of 
Mother Earth. Rather, nature should be exposed in all its catastrophic 
contingency and indeterminacy, and human agency should assume the 
whole unpredictability of the consequences of its activity. (Žižek 2017: 237)  
 
This ‘contingency’, ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘unpredictability’ is echoed in Morton’s 
(2016) dark ecology, which is grounded in ‘living with the strange’ acknowledgment 
of the symbiotic real. In fact, it is this strange acknowledgement which is reflected in 
the subject’s relation to the objet a, referred to as that ‘strange object which is 
nothing but the inscription of the subject itself into the field of objects’ (Žižek 2016: 
81 [italics added]). 
In summary, rather than viewing nature as idealistically and/or ideologically 
‘over there’, naturally balanced or harmoniously un-besmirched by the hubris of 
human activity, we can instead follow Lacan’s account of ‘objet a – an object whose 
status is that of an anamorphosis’ (Žižek 2016: 81) – in acknowledging the 
‘anamorphic’ effect that nature can have and how it can help re-orientate us to the 
ambiguity and inherent contradictions that underlie nature’s symbolization. In doing 
so, we posit a strange symbiosis with nature, grounded on the premise that the 
impact of our climate change interventions is largely unknown and that such 
‘unknowingnesss’ stems from our own ‘collective activity’ in/with nature (Žižek 2016: 
12). In the same way that Morton (2017) promotes a ‘tuning’ with the non-human, 
Žižek’s attention to the subject can help draw attention to our own practices with/in 
nature and the effect of these practices as constitutive of our understandings of 
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nature. In short, such understanding should not lose sight of the contingency, 
ambivalence and strange surprises that emanate from our collective and 
unpredictable attempts to symbolize nature. 
 
Analysing mountain bike trail builders 
We chose to consider mountain bike trail builders due to their use of organic and/or 
inorganic materials to construct and maintain a rideable network of trails to suit a 
range of different interests and abilities. The type of building undertaken by 
individuals is dependent on a number of aspects, including their level of 
commitment; their perceived impact on and relationship with the landscapes in 
which they work; their own riding preferences; and, their adherence to English 
access laws. For example, some trail builders may work for large contractors who 
specialize in the development and management of multi-purpose trail centres, 
creating ‘features not found readily on so called ‘natural’ trails outside the centres 
and (in theory at least) standardising skill and technical requirements through trail 
grading’ (Gibbs and Holloway 2018: 250). Others may be involved in ‘guerilla’ 
activities, creating ‘unmapped trails or obstacles … alongside the formally 
sanctioned routes’ (Gibbs and Holloway 2018: 254). In either case, trails are always 
part of larger social, cultural and environmental systems that require careful and 
diligent planning and collaboration on behalf of the builder (Pothecary 2013). Even 
when trail building activities are less formal in nature they still require consideration 
of the needs of multiple user groups, whilst taking various environmental and 
geographical factors into account. 
With this in mind, the data in this study was drawn from twenty semi-
structured interviews with mountain bike trail builders in England. The interviews 
formed part of a wider research project examining nature connection(s), the 
materialisation of dirt and the politics of multi-use trails. Of the twenty participants 
who agreed to be interviewed, fourteen were involved with a local advocacy group; 
three worked on behalf of a contractor or large organisation, such as, the Forestry 
Commission; and, three worked independently to informally develop or maintain an 
existing trail network. Participants ranged from 18 to 62 years old and all but one 
was male. As such, this sample mirrors other findings regarding the demographic 
composition of mountain bike cultures more generally (IMBA 2015). 
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Over the course of the interviews we were able to acquire rich qualitative data 
that went beyond other, less personal approaches, such as, surveys or observations 
(Brighton and Williams 2018). Long (2007) has argued that interviews allow the 
researcher to clarify questions asked, whilst delving deeper into the participants’ 
motivations and experiences. In this study, this was an important facet of our 
methodology as it helped us to provide reassurance and clarification of the research 
aims, especially when individuals expressed anxiety about the representation of 
certain (often illegal) activities. Accordingly, we were always keen to ensure that 
interviewees were given ample time to consider their responses, and where 
possible, encouraged participants to explore experiences that may at first have 
seemed tangential to the aims of the study. As a result, the inherent flexibility of the 
semi-structured interview enabled the participants to contribute further layers of 
meaning to the stories being told (Opdenakker 2006). These stories were then 
thematically analyzed (Braun and Clarke 2006). This method allowed us to identify, 
analyse, interpret and report reoccurring experiences, feelings, perceptions and 
behaviours, whilst locating these within a particular social context (Sparkes and 
Smith 2014).1 
In what follows, we present what Knapik labels an ‘interactive analysis’ 
(Knapik 2013: 90); that is, an analysis which is jointly created through months of 
dialogue between researcher and researched to reach a shared understanding of 
the (emergent) relationship between mountain biking, trail building and nature. The 
following sections will consider this relationship in further detail. 
 
Creating the perfect trail: Construction through destruction 
In accordance with the previous discussion of Lacan’s objet a, it became noticeably 
apparent from the responses that there was no ‘perfect’ trail that could be built. This 
was reflected in the following comments from Steve, Paul and Conor:   
 
The perfect trail will vary from person to person. (Steve) 
 
… as mountain bikers we all like different things and you also want a variety. 
(Paul) 
 
… everyone’s idea of perfect is different. (Conor) 
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What is significant to Lacan’s objet a, is that although it plays an important role in 
constituting the subject, paradoxically, it can never be accessed directly. Certainly, 
such plurality does not posit a form of social constructionism, whereby the variety of 
interpretations simply prevent no single definition. Instead, such plurality ‘is itself 
grounded in our real struggles’ (Žižek 2013). In fact, discussion of the ‘struggles’ that 
trail builders faced, immediately followed the above statements. Here, the various 
ways in which a ‘perfect trail’ could be defined was grounded in the struggles that 
occurred between the various groups who frequented the trail digging sites. This 
was noted in the following responses: 
 
People are passionate about mountain bikes, but other people are equally 
passionate about foresting, so you have to try and convince them of the 
benefits. Most foresters are often of the opinion of: ‘why would you want to 
build mountain bike trails through these woods?’, whereas a mountain biker 
would be like, ‘why would you not?’ (Scott) 
 
I would say that the perfect trail differs from one rider to another and that can 
be quite difficult with the trail building. (Christine) 
 
In such instances, discussions on the perfect trail and its impact on the environment 
would often centre on a ‘minimal difference’; indeed, a line of contention that 
delineated between different perspectives. Here, Andy explained: 
 
So as long as you are not coming through a natural habitat I don’t think we 
are damaging nature, because if you look at the hillside and take two different 
people – someone who is really into outdoor activities – they might look at the 
hillside and think ‘that is absolutely glorious’, ‘that’s a hillside and that’s being 
used and people are being active and that’s great’. So actually that is a 
beautiful thing. Whereas if you take someone else’s perspective who perhaps 
isn’t into activities or has a different viewpoint, they may look at the hillside 
and say: ‘that’s destroyed because it wasn’t what it naturally was’. I 
personally don’t think that it is damaging to nature, but I do understand the 
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perspective, and the aesthetics side. There is always a right place and a 
wrong place. 
 
Notice how Andy’s remarks echo Žižek’s (2006) reference to the parallax Real. Such 
a notion refers to ‘the minimal difference that cuts across and divides the same 
object among the various different perspectives’ (Flisfeder 2017: 147); perspectives 
that, for Andy, were minimally aligned in the contention that there was a ‘right place’ 
and a ‘wrong place’ to build trails. Furthermore, this parallax works in conjunction 
with Lacan’s objet a, as evident in Andy’s shift in perspective (‘I do understand the 
[alternative] perspective’) and in the fact that neither perspective ever constituted a 
perfect trail-nature alignment. In both cases, the construction of a ‘perfect trail’ was 
subjectively perceived as a parallax that either ‘added to’ or ‘ruined’ the natural 
environment. 
In accordance with Žižek’s critique of nature, we can consider how such 
aesthetics serve to support an understanding of nature as being grounded in a 
harmonious balance? In various responses, trail builders commented upon the 
‘maintenance’ that was required to sustain the trails. Steve noted that: 
 
A lot of this is more about maintenance than creating new trails. … Over the 
years the trail got shittier and shittier so I spent some time working on that – 
draining the puddles, taking out straight lines and putting features back in. … 
On the whole I am not trying to do major engineering. It’s minimal 
intervention. 
 
While this serves to underscore the notion that human intervention can ‘restore’ 
balance between the trail and its ‘natural’ surroundings, we argue that such 
examples present a more nuanced consideration of the relationship between the 
trail builders and nature. That is, rather than restoring ‘balance’ to nature, in 
Duncan’s response, such interaction between trail building and nature could elicit 
certain ‘understandings’: 
 
I’ve met some people, because they’ve always ridden in the same place, who 
understand how the local dirt, the local stone, the local – whatever they are 
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using to build – they learn how it works and how it reacts to water, drainage 
and use. 
 
Such understanding was grounded in an appreciation of nature’s own natural 
destruction of the trail, reflected in the relation between the ‘local dirt/stone’ and its 
reaction to ‘water’. It is here that we can begin to identify how, ecologically, the trail 
builders learnt to associate themselves with the contingency of nature. 
Notably, this contingency was reflected in what the trail builders referred to as 
‘blending in’. Both Paul and Phil stated that: 
 
The best trails definitely just blend in. (Paul) 
 
… the art is getting it to blend back in. Everything I do I try and make it look 
like it’s been there forever. You have to resist the temptation to ride things 
that you have just built, to test them. So, leave it until Spring. (Phil) 
 
In fact, a neatly organised trail was, paradoxically, an ‘eyesore’. Tony explained: 
 
When we do stuff in the woods, I hear stuff like: ‘it’s got to be sympathetic to 
the environment and blend in’, but my feeling is yes you build it and it is a bit 
of an eyesore when it’s first built, but give it a year or a winter and everything 
blends in. The edges grow back in, it stops looking so defined, bikes ride over 
it, everything becomes a uniform shade of brownish colour, which matches 
the rest of the wood … when its first built it looks a bit stark, it looks a bit 
gleaming white and a bit straight edged. But, within 12 months it’s all 
weathered in, the edges have become blurred, and the colours have melded 
with what’s there. 
 
When successfully completed, such ‘blending in’ would often go unnoticed: 
 
People often don’t realise how much work we’ve done because we’ve 
blended it back in. We’ll move moss onto the top of the berm so that starts 
growing again. So, it’s keeping a low impact; a low visual impact on the 
environment. Un-obtrusive. (Conor) 
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What is apparent in the above examples, is how an ‘un-obtrusive’ and ‘low-impact’ 
‘blending in’ was amiable to nature’s own ‘natural’ contingency. That is, rather than 
centring on a maintenance that kept the track tidy and well-kept, well-constructed 
trails were maintained through overgrowing and by the trail being ‘weathered in’. 
Indeed, such trails were clearly improved by nature’s inherent ‘un-balance’ and its 
own natural destruction. Furthermore, in the case of Conor, a trail’s construction 
rested on a strange paradox, whereby a good construction was one that maintained 
‘a low visual impact’; in other words, a trail that was unnaturally natural. It is in 
exploring this unnatural nature that the following section will consider. 
 
 
Unnatural nature 
As noted in the previous section, a key characteristic of constructing and 
maintaining trails rested upon a form of ‘blending in’ which served to associate the 
trails with nature’s ‘natural’ contingency. For Steve, such contingency could help add 
to a trail’s ‘uniqueness’: 
 
That’s what’s unique about these mountain bike trails, you are inherently 
unstable, so you can’t look up, but want to, and when you get to the bottom 
you are always yearning for more. 
 
In Steve’s example, the desire ‘for more’ was clearly related to trails that resulted in 
the rider being ‘inherently unstable’. This instability was achieved through certain 
dips, rocks and foliage. It is in this sense that an ecological awareness was reflected 
in the relationship between the trail builder, the trail and nature. Take, the following 
examples:  
 
What suits me is natural, or as natural as trails can be – they have all been 
built by people or ‘things’ whether it’s a pack horse or whatever. (Steve) 
 
I like stuff to look like a natural path, not man made. (Chris) 
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In fact, for a ‘natural path’ to look non-man made, Christine explained that you need 
to ‘[be] quite unnatural about putting boundaries around it [the trail]’. This 
contradiction was acknowledged by Gary: 
 
When I’m riding on trails, I prefer the concept of, in speech marks, ‘natural’ 
trails, so I guess I’d certainly steer towards things being natural and fitting 
with the landscape – not standing out. … At the same time no tracks are 
natural, they’ve all been put there for a purpose. Given time they will all be 
deemed as fitting in and being natural. 
 
By putting the concept of nature in inverted commas, Gary is alert to the way in 
which interpretations of nature are both ambivalent and highly contested 
(Cherrington et al. 2018; Cherrington and Gregory 2017). Additionally, whereas 
Gary’s reference to time highlights how nature provided a constitutive role in the 
‘naturalising’ of a trail, John’s remarks were notable to the extent that he believed 
building trails supported bio-diversity: 
 
To me, the thing about a mountain bike trail is that it’s a corridor. So, from a 
nature point of view, if you were in the middle of a woods [… it’s] very 
homogenous. You put a trail corridor through, you have light changes and 
you create a very different habitat. So, in a way you are improving the 
biodiversity by putting a trail in there because it gives an opportunity for the 
place to be slightly different. So, if you’ve got a hillside that is all the same it 
will be all the same all the time. … from my point of view, it’s a beneficial 
change because there’s an opportunity for a slightly different eco-system. … 
yes, it’s different but it’s just a different environment. 
 
What becomes apparent from John’s explanation is how his own ‘unnatural’ actions 
(constructing a trail corridor in the middle of a forest) served to improve the bio-
diversity of the environment. This was achieved by varying its eco-system and by 
ensuring that nature’s natural ‘homogeneity’ was undermined. This offers a unique 
perspective on the relation between human praxis and nature. Notable for the fact 
that it does not deride such action, but instead, offers an alternative perspective on 
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how nature can be diversified through trail building. In short, nature, for both Gary 
and John, was achieved through unnatural processes. 
Indeed, while both the current and the previous section have sought to 
comment upon the process of trail building, with particular attention given to nature’s 
‘natural’ contingency and to the ‘unnatural’ ways that ‘natural’ trails were built, in 
each case, the relation between the trail builders and nature remained predicated on 
a managed relationship. Therefore, the following section will afford closer attention 
to how trail builders related to the contingency of nature. As previously noted, rather 
than symbolizing nature within a horizon of meaning that seeks to return it to a state 
of harmony (Žižek 1991), a process that both seeks to mask our own and nature’s 
inherent lack, the following section will highlight how a radical denaturalising of 
nature can be used to promote a form of ecological awareness that is amiable to the 
strange strangeness of nature’s contingency (Morton 2016, 2018). It is in this sense 
that we will begin to highlight how Morton’s ecological awareness can work in 
correlation with Žižek’s own assertions that we should accept and relate to the 
inherent destructiveness of nature.  
 
A contingent nature 
 
Nature doesn’t care that we’re there. (Robert) 
 
While being careful not to assert a reified conception of nature, Robert’s comment 
alludes to an important significance that was evident across many of the interviewee 
responses. Specifically, that of a nature that was ambivalent (‘doesn’t care’), but, at 
the same time, required a degree of ambivalence on behalf of the trail builders 
themselves. Indeed, such attitudes do not intend to promote a sense of the blasé. 
Instead, while Žižek asserts that ‘we still fight pollution’, he likens such action to the 
notion of ‘open warfare’ (Taylor 2009: 181). He explains: 
 
It’s like in open warfare where you are aware that every firm position you get 
you have to fight for. You are aware that you do not rely on anything. You are 
aware that you are in an open process where the consequences of your acts 
are ultimately unpredictable. You know that in the end you will lose. To 
accept this radical openness of the situation means accepting that there is no 
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final solution, we are just temporarily buying time. And I think that in a strange 
way accepting this open warfare situation is the only true respect of nature. 
(Taylor 2009: 181 [italics added])  
 
When applied to the present study, such respect of nature was clearly reflected in 
Robert’s remarks, where, rather than idealising nature, a far more ambivalent 
acceptance of the futility of the trail builders’ activity was provided. In particular, the 
following examples highlight how a sense of unpredictability, openness and 
temporality underscored the trail builders’ responses. 
First, notice how, in both John and Duncan’s remarks, the idea of building a 
sustainable trail was impossible. 
 
So, what is a sustainable trail? There’s no such thing. If you’re really, really 
lucky a trail will be self-maintaining, which comes down to… if it has just the 
right amount of traffic, the right amount of rainfall, the right amount of 
vegetation. If it has just the right amount of everything people will go ‘oh 
there’s a sustainable trail!’ (John) 
 
I think most people; people who work down their local woods and build jumps 
know that every month they might have to rebuild everything because it gets 
trashed. If you can work with what you’ve got then that works really well, but 
there are limitations to that, certainly when you’re trying to find something 
that’s sustainable. (Duncan) 
 
Again, what we see here is how the notion of ‘sustainability’ was predicated on 
nature’s instability, as reflected in the ‘rainfall’ and the growth of ‘vegetation’ 
presenting ‘limitations’ on the ability to achieve sustainability. In both instances, 
these examples build upon the previous sections, whereby the need to build with 
nature’s ‘natural’ contingency was emphasised. As a result, the unpredictability of 
building a trail rested primarily on deciphering which part of the trail could be used. 
John noted: 
 
So, there is always that thing that you’re looking at it and thinking why you 
are doing it and what you are trying to achieve. I find it fascinating to look at 
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the trail and understand why it’s deteriorating and why it is like it is. What do 
we need to do? Is it a drainage issue? Is it just the riding line? Is it the volume 
of traffic? Is it just worn out? What can we do with it and can we make it a bit 
more interesting to ride? Is it still within the grade? (John) 
 
There was never a certain answer to these questions. Instead, ‘imagining’ a trail 
required orientating oneself to the fact that certain aspects could, unpredictably, ‘pop 
out’: 
 
There are things that you look at when you’re building an enduro trails, like if 
its uphill or a flat section you look at it and go: ‘well that’s not going to be 
good for the enduro’, but you might be sat in a forest and the ground is 
beautiful and dry so you know that it’s going to wear well. Then, all of a 
sudden, you will pop out into a bit and it’s all green and moss hanging from 
the trees and it’s all wet and you think: ‘argh if we come through here it’s 
going to be a nightmare, so you try and route around. (Paul) 
 
Such ‘radical openness’ was reflected in the following responses (Taylor 2009: 181), 
which alluded to the idea of working with whatever was there: 
 
Sometimes when you wonder into the woods and there is a hard frost, a line 
just jumps out at you – it’s just there, because when the frost has laid a path 
has just developed. Spend enough time in a wood and the line just jumps out 
at you eventually. You might just see a rocky outcrop or a wall or something 
like that and just go: ‘do you know what, if I can build a line in and a line out, 
we’ve got a drop-off’. (Phil) 
 
… sometimes you just go… sod it, let’s just start digging and see what 
happens. (Frank) 
 
I mean sometimes you’ll go and they’ll be a bit of a rock and you’ll go: ‘oh 
yeah let’s do that’, and you start and it’s bigger than we thought. So, you’re 
like: ‘aww right, let’s leave it’. ‘No shall we see how big it is?’ Oh, that’s big, 
do you think we could move it? Let’s find out!’ Then there are six or seven of 
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you and a lifting strap and sometimes we have a little 2 tonne ratchet and 
then we see if we can move it. Then we’ll go: ‘what are we going to do now? 
Just leave it there because it will go in the trail at some point!’ Then there’s a 
huge rock sitting at the side of the trail that will go in the trail at some point 
because we’ve moved it about six feet, and it’s all to do with the fact that it 
was raining at the time and we dug around it to get the water away and then 
were like: ‘oh this looks interesting’. (John) 
 
The final example of John is emblematic of the ‘radical openness’ which was 
required when building a trail. Yet, appreciating such contingency was also apparent 
in the inherent temporality of the trail building process. Paradoxically, no trail was 
ever built to completion, but instead, each trail was a way of using, but also, ‘halting’, 
nature’s natural contingency. Certainly, this was never achieved and, as a 
consequence, the act of building was always managed in accordance with nature’s 
inevitable destruction (erosion): 
 
We never build the trail to completion. We would get the line sorted and just 
ride it in over time. You see how natural lined develop, because when you 
walk down a hill it’s so hard to tell exactly how it’s going to be when you get 
out on a bike. So, we always develop it over time and let it evolve over time, 
because if you try to develop it from day one it’s going to be wrong. You have 
to leave it over time. (Harry) 
 
In what follows, we will serve to draw upon the above findings in order to provide a 
final precis on the significance of this contingency for developing an ecological 
awareness. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
With regard to Morton’s (2016) dark ecology as well as Žižek’s (1991) denaturalising 
of nature, this article has served to highlight how our approach to nature, culture and 
ecology can be considered in light of mountain bike trail building. While Morton’s 
object-oriented ontology was critiqued in favour of Žižek’s preference for a 
dialectical approach to subject-object debates, it is argued that such critique can 
further extend our understandings of ecology and, more importantly, to 
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acknowledging our relationship in/with the Anthropocene. In part, this requires 
appreciating the notion of objet a and how its relation to the subject can allow us to 
orientate ourselves to an ecological awareness predicated on the strange (Morton) 
and contingent (Žižek). To this extent, it is our contention that Morton’s dark ecology 
and Žižek’s focus on the radical contingency of nature, offer parallel paths to 
achieving an ecological awareness that neither idealises nor mythologises nature, 
but instead, acknowledges its strange unknowingness. This contention is supported 
by the following findings. 
First, it was noted that there was no ‘perfect trail’ and, by extension, no single 
definition of what nature meant to trail builders, mountain bikers and the various 
other individuals/groups who frequented the same sites. In fact, much like Lacan’s 
objet a, the idea of ‘nature’ was predicated on a minimal difference – a parallax gap 
– from which wider tensions and struggles were enacted around what and who the 
site should be used for. While these differences were allied with particular 
appreciations of an ‘ideal’ landscape, they also highlighted how nature’s own 
erosion and destruction was acknowledged as part of the trail building process. This 
was elaborated in the second findings section, where it was noted that such 
acknowledgement rested upon identifying those ‘natural’ aspects that could be 
unnaturally used to create a trail. Here, opportunities for erosion could subsequently 
be used to help construct the trail; a form of construction that ultimately required 
managing the unmanageable. 
Second, it was noted that in each of the examples a clear sense of relating to 
the contingency of nature was expressed and acknowledged by the trail builders. 
This required an ambivalent relation to nature and its effects on the trail. 
Accordingly, while nature’s contingent destruction ((un)manageable erosion, 
inevitable overgrowing of the trail and the effects of water and drainage) formed part 
of the trail’s existence, at the same time, this contingency was managed and 
organised as part of the trail building process. In other words, in being in/with nature 
the trail builders acted with a sense of temporal awareness that ambivalently 
accepted the radical openness of nature (Taylor 2009). Much like the trail builders, 
this redirects us to the collective activity involved in the symbolizing of nature and, 
more importantly, its subsequent effects. In particular, we contend that this 
‘anamorphic effect’ is central to achieving a dark ecology and to appreciating an 
23 
 
ecological awareness that is open to the symbiotic real (Morton 2017; Žižek 2016). 
That is, such openness is: 
 
extremely traumatic, since we … have to confront a subjectivized Other with 
whom no subjective identification is possible, it having no common measure 
with ‘being human.’ Such an encounter is not an encounter with a deficient 
mode of an Other Subject, but an encounter with an Other at its purest, with 
the abyss of Otherness not covered up or facilitated by imaginary 
identifications which make the Other someone ‘like us,’ someone we can 
emphatically ‘understand’. (Žižek 2015: 12) 
 
This emphatic understanding was clearly reflected by the trail builders’ relation 
in/with nature.  
In conclusion, we believe that the trail builders were able to display an 
ecological awareness that symbiotically revealed a sense of underlying 
ambivalence. By determining nature’s ‘basic epistemological coordinates’, a process 
that required ‘embedding [… nature] into an at least minimally familiar symbolic 
frame-work’ (Vighi 2014: 139), the trail builders presented a ‘symbolic framework’ 
that was amiable to the ambivalent, strange and contingent form of nature.  
  
24 
 
 
 
Funding 
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article. 
 
Notes 
1 We adopted Sparkes and Smith’s six stage process of analysis for thematically 
interpreting the data. 
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the Dialectical Core of Žižek’s Film Criticism,” in M. Flisfeder and L-P. Willis (eds.) 
Žižek and Media Studies: A Reader, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Wark, M. (2015) Molecular Red, London, UK: Verso. 
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